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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses the inter-temporal competition – stability nexus after the global 
financial crises. For this reason, the empirical estimation approach follows a five – step 
procedure. First, we utilise quarterly macroeconomic and balance sheet and income 
statement data for 16 banks operating in the Albanian banking sector over the period 
2008 – 2015. Second, we calculate a new composite index as a measure of bank 
stability conditions, which includes a wide set of information rather than focusing only 
on one aspect of risk. Then, we construct a proxy for bank competition such as the 
Boone indicator. Empirical estimations are based on the General Method of Moments 
approach. A set of robustness checks include also the use of other alternative proxy of 
competition such as the Lerner index and the efficient-adjusted Lerner index, profit 
elasticity and the Herfindahl index. Empirical results strongly support the “competition 
– stability” view after the global financial crises - that higher degree of competition 
boosts further bank stability conditions. Results further indicate that greater 
concentration has also a negative impact on bank stability. Results imply also that bank 
stability is positively linked with macroeconomic conditions and capital ratio and 
inverse with operational efficiency. Finally, we do not find a non-linear relationship 
between competition and stability. 
 
JEL Codes: C26, E32, E43, G21, H63.  
 
Keywords: Bank stability, Competition, Boone indicator, Panel Data, GMM. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The international process of banking liberalisation, triggered by excessive bank risk 
taking, has gone hand in hand with an increased occurrence of systemic banking crises, 
culminating during the Global Financial Crises (henceforth GFC) of 2007-2009 (Beck, 
et al., (2013). This has yet again heightened interest on how bank stability is affected by 
market structure developments in particular those related the degree of bank 
competition. However, there is not yet a scientific consensus on whether bank 
competition mitigates or exacerbates bank stability as the predications emerging from 
the theoretical models and empirical studies are ambiguous and so far are also 
inconclusive (Kasman and Carvallo, 2014). The traditional view argues that fiercer 
competition among banks would give them proper incentives to obey the rules 
prudently and therefore lead to a more efficiency banking system, which benefits bank 
stability (Boyd and De Nicolo 2005, Beck, et al., 2006, Schaeck, et al., 2009 and 
Schaeck and Cihak 2014). However, others have challenged this view, instead arguing 
that higher competition among banks reduces market power and profit margins, which 
essentially lowers the franchise value of banks. As a result, this will encourage banks to 
take greater risks so as to make up the loss of declined profit (franchise value), which 
may also lead them to take on more risky investment approach and eventually increase 
the possibility of a bank crisis (Keeley 1990, Allen and Gale 2004, Boyd, et al., 2006, 
Agorakia et al., 2011, Leroy and Lucotte 2017).  
 
This similarly inconclusive debate is particularly critical for Albania, where the 
financial system consists mainly of the operation of the banking sector and a large 
number of banks operate in a specific small opened economy, and equity market is 
remarkably underdeveloped. For example, by the end of 2015, the ratio of financial 
system assets to GDP reached 99.2%, with the banking sector owning 91.4% of 
financial system assets (90.6% of GDP), while stock market capitalization is the lowest 
in South – Eastern Europe (SEE). On the one hand, the financial developments of the 
banking sector has been the main driving force behind economic prospect, while 
improving market and macroeconomic conditions, as well as increasing competition 
have motivated larger foreign banks in more developed countries, mostly in the 
Eurozone, operating at relatively lower margins to extend cross-border operations into 
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potentially new and more profitable market such as that in Albania. On the other hand, 
such patterns are also raising concerns about the degree of competition in the Albanian 
banking sector, which is often criticised for being “overbanked”. Therefore, concerns 
remain high as bank stability may be triggered by excessive bank risk-taking due to 
further competition, which may shift their focus towards higher profits while ceasing to 
monitor and to assess risk properly. In another aspect, the GFC did not affect the 
Albanian economy as strongly as it affected other countries in the SEE. At the same 
time, banks showed an apparent resilience during this period and similarly they emerged 
from the GFC in a relatively stable position. However, among other challenging things, 
problems of banks being “too-big-too-fail has also emerged. First, one problem lies in 
terms of market share, as the 6 largest banks hold nearly 80% of the market. Second, at 
a ratio of nearly 16.2% for the whole market and 22.2% for the large banks, 
the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) suggests that the Albanian banking sector is 
"moderately concentrated". Similarly, evidences (See also Graph 1 in Appendix A) 
show that there is a relatively close relationship between the degree of market power 
and the extent to which banks are exposed to greater instability, which suggests that 
competition foreheads bank fragility over time. Therefore, the effect of the regulatory 
framework on competition and banks’ risk-taking incentives and ultimately bank 
stability make it a particularly interesting environment in which to study the 
competition-stability nexus. 
 
Against this background, the existing literature provides a fairly comprehensive review 
on competition-stability nexus, but of these cases still one question needs to be 
answered empirically as there is no evidence on the nature of this relationship in the 
case of a small-opened emerging economy, namely Albania, and in particular after the 
GFC. The main question, thus, addressed in this paper focuses on how competition 
affects bank stability after the GFC. The paper makes use of a sample with quarterly 
data for 16 banks operating in the Albanian financial sector over the period 2008 – 
2015. The empirical estimation approach follows a five-step procedure. First, we 
constructed a new composite individual bank stability indicator. Second, we estimate a 
competition indicator as suggested by Boone (2008). Then, our specified model is 
estimated based on the General Method of Moments (GMM) approach. In addition, we 
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deepen our empirical analysis by checking for a possible non-linear relationship 
between competition and stability in the case of Albanian banking sector. Finally, we 
use also other alternative structural and non-structural measure of competition, such as 
the Lerner index and the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index, as well as the profit elasticity 
and the HHI. 
 
This paper complements and extends existing literature on this issue in several aspects. 
First, this paper neither uses real episodes of banking crises or binary approach as a 
proxy for instability moments nor it uses the Z-score or credit risk as an in-variant 
measure of the bank’s risk-taking behaviour and distance to solvency, to which Fu, et 
al., (2014) provides some arguments against them as means of bank stability proxies. 
By contrast, rather than focusing only in one aspect of bank risk exposure e.g. capital, 
profitability or credit risk, we proceed by using instead a rather more sophisticated 
proxy for bank stability that includes instead a wide range of information that is based 
on consolidated balance sheet data with regards to different aspect of bank stability 
conditions. Then, our proxy for bank stability is estimated through a set of statistical 
approaches that includes also the use of the principal component analysis approach. 
Therefore, we strongly believe that our indicator is qualitatively more capable to capture 
directly the most common factor identifying any possibility of outright bank defaults 
or/and instability episodes without much loss of information. This approach is 
advantageous even to the fact that it avoids any pitfalls (e.g. insufficient number of data 
or false signals) of using the binary approach to crises episodes. At the same time, it 
solves also for any endogeneity problems between the right hand side and the left hand 
side variables as mention above. At our best knowledge, no previous study has 
employed such bank stability indicator as the dependent variable to investigate the 
competition - stability nexus and we believe this is an important step forward toward a 
better understanding of the underlying mechanisms. Second, to the best of our 
knowledge this is also the first study to investigate empirically competition-stability 
nexus focusing only in the period after the GFC. On the one hand, this highlights the 
impact of the global turmoil on individual banks’ risk exposure. On the other hand, it is 
another way to test how the financial crisis has changed this relationship. Furthermore, 
different from previous papers that rely on the use of different forms of Lerner index, H-
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Statistics or concentrations ratios as a proxy for competition, we improve further the 
empirical analyses on this field by using instead an alternative competition indicator, 
such as the one proposed by Boone (2008), which is advantageous even to the the fact 
that it incorporates also the concept of efficiency structure based on bank behaviour. 
Thirdly, this paper avoids any pitfall as described by Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) 
related to data issues and ensure comparability across both dependent and independent 
variables since it focuses only on a single country. Finally, we do not make use of data 
from the Bankscope database, but rather we use data taken from the Bank of Albania, 
which provides the most accurate and reliable dataset on banking sector data.  
 
The empirical findings provide strong evidence supporting the “competition-stability” 
view that greater degree of competition improves further bank stability conditions. This 
implies that there is no trade-off between competition and bank stability in the banking 
sector in Albania. A number of robustness checks confirm also our main findings that 
support the “completion-stability” view. Results further indicate that greater 
concentration has also a negative impact on bank stability. By contrast, we find no 
evidence of a non-linear relationship in the competition-stability nexus. Finally, with 
regards to the control variables, we find that macroeconomic conditions are relatively 
important for bank stability. Similarly, bank stability is also conditional to improving 
operation efficiency and capital structure of the banks. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the literature 
review. Section 3 presents the methodology with regards to model specification and 
data. The main results are presented in Section 4. The material concludes in section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The issue of competition-stability nexus remains still ambiguous and unresolved, 
despite a large body of theoretical and empirical literature (Kasman and Carvallo 2014) 
that explains the reasons and channels through which competition affects bank stability, 
long before the GFC started. From a theoretical perspective, there are two major streams 
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with utterly opposite views. The competition-fragility view
2
 argues on a (negative) 
margin effect hypothesis assuming that increasing competition endangers bank stability 
as it erodes banks’ net present value of profits to zero. Therefore, without potential to 
make future profits (i.e. zero franchise value) banks would relax their investment 
selection requirements, which in return would give them an incentive to expand or/and 
take on new riskier policies, including high-risk and high yield investments, in an 
attempt to maintain the former level of profits. Conversely, the “competition – stability” 
view
3
 argues on a (positive) margin effect hypothesis. This approach is based on the 
assumption that banks that have some market power (i.e. positive franchise value) tend 
to undertake some “credit rationing”. Hence, this group of banks might be more prudent 
in the aspect of risk-taking as they have ‘something to lose’, which may induce them 
adverse selection to risky investments (those that jeopardize future profits may not be 
accepted by banks authorities). Similarly, the considerable market power of only few 
banks would enhance profits through higher interest rate on loans [Boyd, et al., (2004)], 
which may provide banks with higher “capital buffer” to protect them from adverse 
external risks and moral hazard (risk shifting) with a negative impact on the stability of 
the banking system (Beck, et al. 2006, Berger and Bouwman 2013, Fiordelisi and Mare 
2014). Finally, there are also other studies that assume that U-shaped relationship exists. 
For example, building on the model of Body and De Nicolo (2005), Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo (2010) show evidences that the probability of bank default first goes down, but 
then does up after a certain point as bank completion increase. This approach is also 
supported by findings of Berger, et al., (2009), Jeona and Limb (2013), Jiménez, et al., 
(2013), Liu, et al., (2013), Samantas (2013). 
 
In line with the theoretical views, several authors have tested the competition-stability 
nexus by focusing on competition indicators that are based on the structure-conduct-
paradigm (Beck, et al., 2006, Boyd, et al., 2006, Behname, (2012), de Haan and 
Poghosyan 2012a, de Haan and Poghosyan 2012b, Mirzaei, et al., 2013, Câpraru and 
Andrieş 2015, Fernández, et al., 2016, Pawlowska 2016) and the relatively market-
power hypothesis (Hesse and Čihák 2007, Levy Yeyati and Micco 2007, Uhde and 
                                                          
2 See among others Keeley (1990) Matutes and Vives (2000); Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000); Allen and Gale (2004); 
Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006); Evrensel, (2008); Wagner (2010); and De Haan and Poghosyan, (2012a). 
3 See among others Boot, et al., (2000), Bond and De Nicolò (2005), Berger, et al., (2009); De Nicolò and Lucchetta (2009); Beck, 
et al., (2006); Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
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Heimeshoff 2009, Wagner 2010, Fiordelisi and Mare 2014, Pawlowska 2016), but have 
found mixed evidence. For instance, Boyd, et al., (2006) find that the probability of 
banks failure increases with market concentration, but as Berger, et al., (2009) suggest 
their conclusions are drawn using some form of concentration indicators, which might 
be insufficient measures to proxy properly developments within any given market 
structure. Bushman, et al., (2016) use instead new survey approach of competition and 
find strong evidence that greater competition surges both individual bank risk and 
bank’s contribution to system-wide risk. However, Leroy and Lucotte (2017) use the Z-
score and the Lerner index as in Ahmed and Mallick (2017) to analyse the relationship 
between competition and bank risk across a large sample of European listed banks over 
the period 2004–2013. Results suggest that competition encourages bank risk-taking 
and then increases individual bank fragility. Other papers that confirm the competition-
fragility view include Beck, et al., (2013), Jiménez, et al., (2013), Soedarmonoa, et al., 
(2013), Fu, et al., (2014), Weiß, et al., (2014). 
 
By contrast, Beck, et al., (2006) and De Nicolò, et al., (2009) found that crises are less 
likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems. Similar, based on a 
dataset for 38 countries during the period 1980–2003, Schaeck et al., (2009) use the 
Panzar and Rosse H-Statistics, as an alternative measure of the degree of 
competitiveness and conclude that more competitive banking systems are less prone to 
systemic crises and that time to crisis is longer in a competitive environment. However, 
Jiménez, et al., (2013) suggest that standard measure of market concentration do not 
affect the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio, but found evidence in favour of the 
franchise value paradigm when using the Lerner index. Other recent empirical papers 
that validate “competition-stability” view includes Jiménez, at al., (2010), Nguyen, et 
al., (2012), Liu and Molyneux (2012), Amidu and Wolfe (2013), Jeona and Limb 
(2013), Schaeck and Cihak (2014). In addition, there are also other papers that validate 
both views. For example, Berger, et al., (2009) analyse empirically the link between 
credit risk (NPL ratio), bank stability (Z-score index) and the capital ratio (capital ratio) 
and several measures of market power (Lerner and HHI), using bank level data from 
Bankscope on 8235 banks in 23 developed countries. Their results suggest, consistent 
with the traditional “competition-fragility” view, that banks with a higher degree of 
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market power also have less overall risk exposure. However, the data also provide some 
support for one element of the competition-stability view – that market power increases 
loan risk, which may be offset in part by higher capital rations. 
 
The above mention empirical papers produce cross-country evidences. A few studies 
focusing on a single banking sector includes Zhao, et al., (2010), Fungacova and Weill 
(2013) and Kasman and Kasman (2015) who yet again provide a mixture of results on 
the competition-stability nexus. On the contrary, the most relevant work that loosely 
relates to the research question we address in the case of Albania is done by Dushku 
(2016)
4
 who investigates the link between competition (measured by Lerner Index) and 
bank risk-taking (measured by Z-Score) for 15 banks operating in Albanian banking 
system during the period 2004 – 2014. The author finds a positive link between 
competition and bank risk and show that the nexus between total (plus foreign) credit 
risk and competition is nonlinear.  
 
Similar to the theoretical debate, the empirical findings are also challenging. One key 
challenge that explains the mixed results is related with the inappropriate measure to 
identify properly bank competition and bank stability [Pawlowska (2016)]. For 
example, Carbó, et al., (2009) found that existing indicators of competition (i.e. Lerner 
index, the H-Statistics) give different conclusions concerning the degree of competition 
as they tend to measure different things
5
. In terms of the bank risk measure, the 
available measure is even more limited, while the biggest concern is that most of them 
do not distinguish which aspect of risks they effectively approximate. It is also 
obviously that the biggest obstacle and the conclusions of the extant empirical research 
vary greatly and depend heavily on the data used [Bushman, et al., (2016)].  
 
This paper complements and extends existing literature on this issue as it make use of 
superior indicators to measure the state of bank competition and banks stability. Most 
existing empirical studies investigating this relationship at the microeconomic level 
focus either on credit risk alone, using some form of credit risk measure such as the 
NPL ratios, or resort to bank risk measures constructed from balance sheet information, 
                                                          
4 Note (2006) applies the Panzar-Rosse methodology to measure the competition degree in the Albanian banking system during the 
period 1999 - 2006. The author finds that Albanian banks operate in monopolistic competition conditions. 
5 See also Bikker, et al., (2012). 
10 
 
such as the Z-Score. In fact, while the Z-score can be interpreted as the number of 
standard deviations by which a bank is removed from insolvency, the NPL ratio focuses 
only on credit risk, but leaves out concerns with regards to liquidity and capital risk or 
other sort of risks that is linked to the market in which banks operate. Hence, neither of 
them is a perfect substitute proxy to account for actual bank distress or the probability 
of default, which are without doubt the most appropriate concepts to define bank risk 
(Fu, et al., 2014, Kick and Prieto 2015). Another concern, as Beck, et al., (2013) place 
in their empirical analysis, is that Z-Score and Lerner both include profitability in the 
numerator and any positive relationship between the two might thus be mechanical 
rather than economically meaningful. In addition, we neither focused on real episodes of 
banking crises nor do we use the binary approach as a proxy for instability episodes, 
which both may either provide insufficient data for estimation purpose or be based on 
threshold level that are easily criticised or that may produce falls signals of instability 
moments. By contrast, we extend empirical findings by including instead a more 
sophisticated proxy for bank stability that is based on a wide range of information that 
includes different aspect of bank risk exposure rather than focusing only on credit risk 
or profitability and at the same time benefits through the use of the principal component 
analysis approach as explained by Shijaku (2016). At our best knowledge, no previous 
study has employed such bank stability indicator as the dependent variable to 
investigate the competition-bank stability nexus and we believe this is an important step 
forward toward a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms. On the one hand, 
we use a new measure of competition based on the reallocation of profits from 
inefficient banks to efficient ones as proposed by Boone, (2008), which has been used 
in recent studies
6
.  
 
The existing literature provides a fairly comprehensive review on competition-stability 
nexus, but of these cases still one question needs to be answered empirically as there is 
no evidence on the nature of this relationship in the case of a small-opened emerging 
economy, namely Albania, and in particular after the GFC. The main question, thus, 
addressed in this paper focuses on how competition affects bank stability after the GFC. 
The idea is to investigate empirically whether and how, among others things, bank 
                                                          
6 See also Van Leuvensteijn, et al., 2011, Van Leuvensteijn, et al., 2013, Kasman and Carvallo 2014, Marques-Ibanez, et al., (2014), 
Schaeck and Čihák 2014, Duyguna, et al., 2015, Kasman and Kasman 2015). 
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competition is also important for bank stability in the aftermath of the GFC in the case 
of Albanian banking sector. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY APPROACH 
 
3.1. DEPENDANT VARIABLE 
 
The empirical literature provides a good description of how one might attempt to build a 
composite indicator with regards to stability concerns, but obviously this paper follows 
the Uniform Financial Rating System approach, introduced by the US regulation in 
1979, referred to as CAELS rating (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Earnings, Liquidity 
and Sensitivity to market risk
7
 as presented in Table 1 in Appendix. First, using the 
statistical methods, each indicator included in each of these categorises is normalised 
into a common scale with mean of zero and standard deviation of one
8
. The formula is 
given as: 
 
 
(1) 
 
Where, Xt represents the value of indicators X during period t; μ is the mean and σ is the 
standard deviation. Second, all the normalised values of the set of correlated indicators 
used within one category is then converted into a single uncorrelated index by means of 
the statistical procedure, namely the principal component analysis approach, which is 
yet again standardised based on the procedure in Equation (1). Then, the estimated sub-
index are transformed between the values [0, 1] using exponential transformation [1 / (1 
+ exp(-Z*)]. Finally, our bank stability index (CAELS) is derived as a sum of the 
estimated exponential transformed sub-indexes, as follows: 
 
 
(2) 
 
   
 
(3) 
                                                          
7 This approach is also used by International Monetary Fund Compilation Guide 2006 on Financial Soundness Indicators, but others 
authors e.g. Altman (1986), Sere-Ejembi, et al., (2014) and Cleary and Hebb (2016). 
8 Normalizing the values avoids introducing aggregation distortions arising from differences in the means of the indicators. 
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Where, n is the number of indicators in each sub-index; ‘C’ relates to the capital 
adequacy; ‘A’ represents a proxy to asset quality; ‘E’ is a proxy for bank earnings; ‘L’ 
represents a proxy to liquidity risk; and ‘S’ is related to the sensitivity of market risk. 
All indicators used within each category are reported in Table 1 in Appendix. Z* is the 
exponential transformed simple average of the normalised values of each indicator 
included into the sub-index of the individual bank stability index. Then, the estimated 
index shows a relatively indicator, where an increase in the value of the index at any 
particular dimension indicates a lower risk in this dimension for the period, compared 
with other periods. 
 
The advantage of this approach is fourfold. First, as presented in Graph 2 in appendix, 
CAELS represents a useful “complement” to on-side examination, rather than a 
substitute for them [Betz, et al., (2014)], and thereby creates an internal comprehensive 
monthly-based supervisory “thermometer” instrument that can be used to evaluate bank 
stability in real time and on an uniform basis and to identify those institutions that 
requires special supervisory attention and concern with regards to both the present and 
future banking sector conditions. Second, it builds on the recommendation of ECB 
(2007). Therefore, we believe it reflects properly the Albanian financial structure as it 
attaches more weight to banking sector, which is the most prominent agents in the 
financial markets, while it takes advantages of a broad range of bank level data. Third, 
the PCA approach highlights the most common factor identifying the patterns in the 
data without much loss of information, which at the same time solves for any 
endogeneity problems between the right-hand side and the left-hand side variables as 
mention above. Four, it does not take the probability form of the binary approach, which 
might expose it either to limitations of insufficient number of episodes or to the 
vulnerability of the methodology employed to calculate the threshold level. The latter 
might even provide falls banking distress signals. Rather it consists of a simple 
approach that is easier to explain and implement. Most importantly it allows analysing 
the state of the bank as it develops and is also applicable for cross-section comparisons.  
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3.2. MEASURING COMPETITION: THE BOONE INDICATOR 
 
The literature review offers several methods to estimate the degree of competition of a 
specific sector since this indicator cannot be measured directly. Some of them fall under 
the so-called the Structural-Conduct-Performance (SCP) approach, which frequently 
includes indicators referring to numbers of banks, market share, concentration ratio or 
the Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index (HHI). The other methods are influenced by the New 
Empirical Industrial Organisation literature, which has been developed primarily from 
the Lerner (1934) index or price-to-cost margin (PCM) approach and the non-structural 
models of Iwata (1974), Breshnahan (1982), Panzar and Rose (1987)
9
. In addition to 
these already popular measures, an alternative measure of competition as proposed by 
Boone (2008) measures the impact of efficiency on performance in terms of profit. The 
idea of this profit-elasticity index, which is also referred as the Boone indicator ( ), 
rests on the assumption that banks with superior efficiency, i.e. banks with lower 
marginal costs, gain more benefits in terms of profit as a result of market share 
reallocation from less efficient banks to more efficient ones and this effect becomes 
stronger in a highly competitive market structure. This means that in a more competitive 
market banks sacrifice more for being in a cost disadvantage position. Put differently, 
banks are punished more harshly in terms of profits for cost inefficiency. Therefore, the 
stronger this effect is the larger in absolute value  will be, which is also an indication 
of greater degree of competitive in that particular market. In the empirical application, 
the simplest equation to identify the Boone indicator, for bank i at time t is defined as 
follows: 
 
 
(4) 
                                                                                                                                                          
where  and  denotes the profit and the marginal cost for banks (proxy efficiency) 
respectively;  is the bank fixed effect;  is a set of control variable associated with the 
coefficient ;  is the log-linearized transformation of the variables; and  is an 
idiosyncratic shock. The market equilibrium condition is E=0. The E-statistic is , 
                                                          
9 The Lerner index has been widely used in recent research including Berger, et al., (2009), Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2012); Fu, et 
al., (2014). Dushku (2015) calculates it in the case of Albania by considering the difference between price and marginal cost as a 
percentage of prices. 
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which gives the profit elasticity, that is, the percentage change in profits of bank i as a 
result of a percentage change in the cost of this bank. Theoretically, this indicator is 
expected to have a negative value, i.e. the increase in costs reduces profit, which can be 
interpreted as a reduction in the ability of the bank to affect its losses due to an increase 
in competition. For this reason, we would expect that more efficient banks may choose 
to translate lower costs either into higher profits or into lower output prices in order to 
gain market share. As a consequence, using this measure for analysing competition in 
the banking sector, some researchers
10
 transform the formula of Boone indicator and 
replace the value of profit with a bank market share, as follows: 
 
 
(5) 
 
Where,  is the market share of bank i at time t. In addition, as in the case of the 
Lerner index, the Boone indicator is based on the estimation of the marginal costs, 
which considering the work by Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) and Dushku (2015 and 2016) 
is estimated through means of a trans-log cost function (TCF), as follows: 
 
 
 
 
(6) 
 
Where,  is the total costs of bank i at time t,  is bank output,  is a vector of input 
prices, namely labour price ( ), price of borrowed funds ( ) and capital price ( ), 
 is a time trend capturing the dynamics of the cost-function (efficiency) over 
time,  is a dummy variable to account for the effect of the GFC, and , , ,  
and  are coeeficients to be estimated.  is a two-component error term computed as 
follows: 
 
 (7) 
 
                                                          
10 Van Leuvensteijn, et al., (2011), Tabak, et al., (2012), Van Leuvensteijn, et al., (2013). 
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Where,  is a two-side error term, and  is a one-sided disturbance term representing 
inefficiency. Then, from Equation (6), assuming that inputs’ prices are homogeneous, 
the marginal cost can be derived as follows: 
 
 
(8) 
 
The cost function must be homogenous of degree one in input prices, which imposes 
some restrictions on the parameter estimates. Linear homogeneity means that the 
percentage increase in all three input prices raises the value of the cost by the same 
proportion. This property implies that the value of these three inputs prices included in 
the cost function represent the total cost. The linear homogeneity in the property of 
input prices requires the following restrictions on the parameter estimates to hold: 
 
 
 
 
(9.1) 
 
 
 
(9.2) 
 
 
(9.3) 
 
For the research purpose we estimate Boone indicator, using both Equation (4) and 
Equation (5). However, the former is operationally impossible due to the negative net 
income generated by some of the banks operating in the Albanian banking system in 
2008-2010. To overcome this problem the value of the bank profit is replaced by the 
volume of net interest profit. Then, Equation (4) and Equation (5) are often run by using 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) approach with random effects. The estimated results 
are reported in Table [4] and [5] in Appendix
11
. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 For a detailed analysis see also Shijaku (2017). 
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3.3. THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
The empirical specified model draws on the extensive review of previous studies related 
to bank fragility, in particular by Betz, et al., (2014) and Black, et al. (2016), but it also 
departs from them as it deepens further the empirical analyses by including also a proxy 
of competition instead of market size. Therefore, model is specified as follows:  
 
 
(10) 
 
Where,  is our stability indicator of bank i at time t, with i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, 
..., T, expressed as a function of a set of explanatory variables such as: (1)  is 
a set of bank-specific explanatory variables, namely operational efficiency and leverage 
ratio;  is an industry explanatory variable that proxy by the competition index; 
 is a set of control variables that account for state of economy, 
which consists of two variables such as output and primary sovereignty risk. α is a 
constant term. β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated.  is an error terms that is 
assumed to be identically and independently distributed with mean of 0 and variance 
.  
 
One potential problem with Equation [10] is the over-identification problems. To 
correct for this issue, the estimation approach is based on the GMM approach as 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover, (1995)
12
. This 
approach is also a virtuous to deal with potential endogeneity problems [Anderson and 
Hsiao (1981)]. The instrument variable is based on the past information of , and to 
limit the number of instruments, we restrict at 4 the lag range used in generating the 
instruments as suggested by Roodman (2006). Then, the Haussmann test is used for 
over-identifying restrictions based on the sample analogy of the moment conditions 
adapted in the estimation process, thereby as to determine the validity of the instrument 
variables (i.e. tests of the lack of serial correlation and consistency of instruments 
variables).  
 
                                                          
12 Han and Phillips (2010) suggest GMM is constructed to be able to achieve partial identification of the stochastic evolution and to 
be robust to the remaining un-modelled components. 
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3.4. DATA 
 
The sample data for this study consists of quarterly data gathered and complied by the 
Bank of Albania, which is taken from balance sheet and income statement items of 16 
banks operating in Albania. The strength of the dataset is its sample coverage and 
reliability of information. It covers all banks operating in Albania in the last two decade. 
The sample consists of 960 quarterly data for 16 banks operating in Albania, since 2001 
Q01.  
 
The variables used to calculate the competition indicator are as a follow. TC is the sum 
of personnel expenses, other administrative expenses and other operating expenses. The 
bank’s single output, Q, is proxy by bank total assets.  is calculated as the ratio of 
personnel expenses over total assets.  is the ratio of other administrative expenses plus 
other operating expenses over total fixed assets.  is the ratio of interest expenditure 
over the sum of total deposits.  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
during the period 2008 Q03 – 2010 Q04, and 0 otherwise. All variables are log-
linearized, besides the CRISIS. 
 
The empirical study focuses on the period 2008 Q02 – 2015 Q03, as the second half of 
2008 marks the beginning of pass-through effects of GFC in the Albanian economy
13
. 
That includes a panel with 448 observations and 28 periods. The variables used for 
empirical analysis are approximated as follows. The bank-specific variables and the 
stability indicator are estimated individually for each bank. CAELS is transformed into 
an index, taking as the base year the average performance during the year 2010. 
EFFICIENCY is the ratio of gross expenditure over gross income. LEVERAGE presents 
the ratio of equity to asset ratio of individual banks. BOONE is a non-structural 
competition index variable as explained above. It is transformed also into an index, 
taking as the base year the average performance during the year 2010. The bank-specific 
variables and the stability indicator are estimated individually for each bank. The 
macroeconomic variables are aggregated indicators that represent the state of the 
                                                          
13 The Albanian economy was not affected directly by the GFC, but the spill-over effects through financial and trade linkages were 
immediately transmitted from 2008 Q04, which at the same time provides a justification why we choose to the empirical 
estimation from this period.  
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economy. GDP represents the real gross domestic production deflating with the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). PSRISK represents the spread between domestic 12 
months T-Bills and the German 12 months T-Bills. Both interest rates are transformed 
in real terms by subtracting the respective domestic and German annual inflation rate. 
All the data are of end-period values. They are log-transformed, besides the PSRISK and 
CRISIS. Further, the dataset developed for this paper has several sources. Data on GDP 
are taken from the Albanian Institute of Statistics. Data on the domestic T-Bills rate are 
taken from the Ministry of Finance. Data on German 12 months T-Bills rate and 
German CPI are taken from Bloomberg. The rest of the data are taken from Bank of 
Albania.  
 
Finally, prior to the empirical estimation, all the data have been subject to a unit root 
test procedure on the argument to understand their properties and also to be sure that 
their order of integration fulfils the criteria for our empirical estimation approach. The 
latter is a pre-required condition in order to receive consistent and unbiased results. 
Therefore, the unit root test approach includes the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
the Phillips-Peron (PP) Fisher Chi-square tests. The reason is twofold. First, these tests 
are built on the on the same null hypothesis that panel variable are stationary. Second, 
they are mostly used for unbalanced panel model, as it is our sample.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. MAIN RESULTS 
 
This section reports the main results of our empirical approach. First, as reported in 
Table 3 in Appendix, the results of the unit root test suggests that EFFICIENCY and 
LEVERAGE are integrated of order zero I(0) and thus enter the model specification in 
level. The other variables are found to pose non-stationary properties and are integrated 
of order one, I(1). Therefore, they enter the model in their first difference, since this 
approach transforms them into a stationary stance
14
. Second, as reported in Table 6 in 
Appendix, we estimate 2 regressions. In each regression we use the same measure of 
competition, but to some methodological changes. First, column [1] reports the results 
                                                          
14 These results are robustness also to other unit root test approaches, including the Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat test and Fisher test. 
Data can be provided upon request. 
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of a linear relationship between competition and stability. Second, column [2] presents 
the results with regards to a possible non-linearity relationship, which is yet again 
estimated based on the GMM approach as explained previously. The model makes uses 
of ‘White Cross-Section’ standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected). At the bottom 
of the table, we report the specification test results for the GMM estimation. First, 
AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond tests for first and second order autocorrelation 
of the residuals. One should reject the null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation 
and not reject the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation of the residuals. 
Second, the Haussmann test of over-identifying restrictions indicates whether the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. The GMM does not require any 
distributional assumptions on the error term and it is more efficient that the Two Least 
Two Square approach as it accounts for heteroskedasticity [Hall (2005)]. The results 
show that in our case the requirements are met as suggested by the p-values of the 
AR(1) and AR(2) tests. In addition, the Haussmann suggests that the instruments used 
in all the specifications are appropriate. This means that our model is properly specified 
and that the empirical analyses are robust and consistent with the GMM estimation 
criterion. 
 
The analyses of estimated coefficients, both external and internal variables, suggest that 
all the explanatory variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant at 
conventional level. For example, the coefficient of GDP is positive, suggesting that 
increases in economic growth have a positive effect on bank stability. This effect is 
even statistically significant suggesting that the performance of economic activity is 
quite crucial for bank stability. It is also of great important to understand, however, that 
from another point of view this result implies that banks place also a relatively consider 
manner to the economic conditions in which they operate, since an upward movements 
in economic activity would improve the situation of the banking system through a 
higher financial intermediation or for low risks related to bank sovereignty risks. 
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Second, PSRISK has the expected negative effect on bank stability in both regressions
15
. 
It implies that decreasing sovereignty primary risk, as measured by the spread ratio of 
domestic and foreign risks, increases bank stability and therefore lower risks are 
expected to materialise through improving stability conditions of banks. This result 
complements the findings of Jutasompakorn, et al., (2014), but by contrast, the 
estimated marginal effect is considered to be relatively small, even though it is 
statistically significant at 10% level. This suggests that banks consider shocks related to 
primary sovereignty risk, even though the pass-through is relative small. The reason is 
fourfold. First, public borrowing has been orientated towards longer term maturities and 
towards foreign borrowing. This has lowered the pressure on banks and at the same time 
has provided the market with more foreign liquidity. Second, the government has taken 
several structural reforms to minimise possible fiscal risks, which includes the pension 
system reform, energetic sector, etc. Third, banks in Albania operate under a flexible 
interest rate to which they place a marginal fixed rate. Therefore, any negative shock 
that leads to an interest rate hike is reflected immediately to their interest barging, 
making them to some extend hedge to interest rate. Finally, but not the least, different 
from other countries, banks in Albania have been well-capitalised and have not 
vulnerable to a shortage of liquidity, despite the recent trends and financial 
disintermediation. 
 
Similarly, other specific variables associated with patterns at bank level are found to be 
crucial for bank stability. They have the expected sign and are statistically significant at 
conventional level. For example, the coefficient related to EFFICIENCY is found to 
have the expected negative sign, supporting the existence of a reserve relationship 
between operational efficiency and bank stability conditions. It suggests that bank 
stability would increase proportionally to any upturns in operational efficiency. At the 
same time, this relationship is also statistically significant at conventional level of 10%, 
suggesting that it is a fundamental issue in terms of stability concerns. Therefore, bank 
should be aware that any policy decision-making in an attempt to make banks more 
attractive, but that might lead to lower productivity would come to a cost in terms of 
                                                          
15 To assure the authenticity of our results, under the assumption of robustness checks, we also specified the model by using a 
primary sovereignty indicator that accounts only for the effect of monetary policy shock, proxy in this model as the spread between 
real term overnight rate and the real EONIA rate. The results were relatively the same. The estimated effect is found to be relatively 
small, even though statistically significant. 
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their stability condition. The reason is twofold. First, in order to be competitive and 
attractive, banks find may find it difficult to pass all the cost to their clients. Second, a 
few large banks dictate the rule interest rate policy, so the others need to follow them, 
and that does not allow them to “overcharge”. In addition, capital patterns are found to 
have the expected positive effect on bank stability condition. This effect is statistically 
significant at 5% level. This suggests that increasing bank capital is a very important 
factor and stability condition improves as bank become more capitalised. By contrast, 
based on size of the coefficient, bank capitalisation is the second most important factor 
in effecting the stability behaviour of the bank, under the specified model. 
 
At the same time, the results indicate that the coefficient of Boone indicator is positive 
implying that greater degree of competition improves the state of bank stability 
conditions, given that higher value of the Boone indicator signifies a higher degree of 
competition. This affect is also found to be statistically significant at conventional level. 
From an empirical point of view, these findings suggest that changes of marginal cost 
have more effects on profits and that market share is crucially subject to more 
competition. Similarly, as competition in the banking sector increases it is likely to 
boost the franchise value and encourage banks to lower their overall risk exposure, thus 
confirming the competition-stability view in the case of Albania. These findings are 
consistent with the “competition-stability view” of other recent studies (Berger and 
Bouwman 2013, Fiordelisi and Mare 2014, Schaeck and Cihak 2014) that greater bank 
competition is associated with higher bank stability. However, from the policy point of 
view one important consideration is that as our measures for competition mainly focus 
on the lending market, it should be kept in mind that these conclusions are quite subject 
to loan markets.  
 
Finally, we use also a quadratic term of the measures of competition to capture a 
possible non-linear relationship between competition and bank stability
16
. Results, as 
reported in Table 6, column [2] in Appendix, reveal an important consideration that is 
that we did not find evidence of non-linearity relationship between competition and 
                                                          
16 See also Jimenez, et al., (2013, Liu, et al., (2013), Fu, et al., (2014), Kasman and Kasman (2015). 
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stability in the case of Albanian banking system, thus rejecting Martinez-Miera and 
Reputto (2010) model
17
.  
 
 
 
4.2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
In an attempt to further enrich our analysis and as a complementary proof we run a 
number of robustness checks on our main model, as specified in Equation (10), but this 
time we use five different alternative measures as proxy for bank competition, which are 
then used also as explanatory variables to get more robust results. For example, column 
[3] in Table 6 in Appendix shows the impact of competition, as measured by an 
alternative Boone indicator that includes also bank capital (Equity) in the estimation of 
the TCF model, on bank stability [See also Equation (B.1 and B.2) in Appendix B]. The 
results are relatively similar to those as in the previous sections re-confirming that 
greater degree of bank competition due to increasing operational efficiency would 
improve bank stability conditions.  
 
On the other hand, as a robustness check, we also use the estimates of marginal cost 
from Equation (8) to calculate the Lerner index [LERNER]
18
 and the efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index [LERNER*]
19
, as well as to estimate the profit elasticity 
[PROFITELASTICITY]
20
, the results of which are respectively reported in column [4], 
[5] and [6]. These results show that the LERNER and LERNER* are negatively related 
to CAELS. The impact is also significant. As mention previously, since the Lerner index 
is inversely proportional to CAELS, it appears that the negative sign for both these 
competition measures show that increases in the degree of bank pricing power are 
positively related to individual bank stability in Albanian banking sector. By contrast, 
the coefficient of PROFITELASTICITY exhibits a positive sign, suggesting that lower 
elasticity of profit would boost bank stability. These results provide yet again another 
                                                          
17 We used also a cubic term of the measures of competition to capture a possible non-linear relationship between competition and 
bank stability, bust still found no supportive evidence. Results are provided upon request. 
18 Following Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) we calculated the Lerner index as . The index is a linear straight 
forward indicator that takes the value between 0 and 1, with lower value indicating greater degree of competition. 
19 [See also Equations (B.3) in Appendix B for the approach used to estimate this index]. 
20 [See also Equations (B.4) in Appendix B for the approach used to estimate this index]. 
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strong supportive evidence for the competition-stability view, re-confirming as 
previously that greater degree of bank competition improves bank stability conditions. 
 
Finally, we also examine the impact of bank concentration on the stability of Albanian 
banks using the HHI
21
. The results are reported in Table 6, Column (7) in Appendix A. 
The negative coefficient for the HHI indicator supports a negative link between market 
power and bank stability. This suggests that lower bank concentration ratio leads to a 
decrease in bank insolvency risk, and therefore a higher degree of bank stability. That is 
that the less concentrated the banking system is the more stable banks are. By contrast, 
based on the size of the respectively coefficients, we find that the impact of bank 
concentration is relatively higher that the extent to which competition effects bank 
stability. On the one hand, it is very clear that the results remain as those analysed in the 
previous sections, as in all the regressions, we find that bank market power is negatively 
related to bank stability, meaning that there is a positive relationship between higher 
degree of competition and stability. These results support both theories of competition-
stability view and concentration-fragility view in the case of Albania showing that 
banks under less degree of market power are, on average, more stable. On the other 
hand, the usage of the alternative competitiveness proxy should be treated as a 
robustness check of the results which further strengths our conclusions in terms of 
competitions. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The developments in the banking market leading to the financial crisis in 2008 
heightened new great challenges for bank stability and systemic risk and competition 
policies. Therefore, this paper fills in the information gap of analysing whether 
competition improves or reduces banking stability for banks operating in Albanian 
banking system during the period 2008 – 2015. Although there have been several 
articles we improve on the existing literature along three crucial dimensions. First, in 
contrast to other bank-level studies, we use the most direct measure of bank stability 
available, which is generated from the unique supervisory dataset collected by the Bank 
                                                          
21 It is calculated using bank total asset as inputs ( , where s represents the market share of each bank in total assets 
in the market). It can range from 0 to 1.0, moving from a huge number of very small firms to a single monopolistic producer. 
Increases of the index generally indicate a decrease in competition and an increase of market power, and vice versa. 
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of Albania to which we analyse the bank competition-stability nexus. Then, we use a set 
of alternative proxy of competition indicators, namely the Boone indicator, the Lerner 
index and the efficient-adjusted Lerner index, profit elasticity and the Herfindahl index. 
Empirical estimations are based on the General Method of Moments approach. Finally, 
we further our studies by checking for non-linearity relationship between competition 
and stability in the case of Albanian banking sector.  
 
The main results provide strong supportive evidence that banks’ behaviour towards 
greater competition has been crucial for boosting bank stability in the aftermath of GFC, 
thus bolstering the “competition – stability” view. From a policy point of view findings 
suggest that bank competition and soundness go hand in hand with each other and that 
higher pricing power during instability periods could simultaneously lead to higher bank 
stability. Results appear to hold for a wide array of other alternative model 
specifications, estimation approaches and variable construction. In addition, we find 
also that during this period bank concentration is inversely correlated to bank stability, 
thus supporting the view that a more concentrated banking system that easies market 
power is more vulnerable to systemic instability. For policymakers analysing bank 
competition these results are crucial not only for the stability of the financial sector, but 
also for the whole economy. Therefore, if one is to boost bank stability during crises 
period than it is fundamentally essential to increase profit margins (franchise value) as 
results imply that intense competition in the banking sector is associated lower riskier 
loan portfolios.  
 
Contrary to the above mentioned results, we provide evidence that do not support a non-
linear relationship between competition and stability in the aftermath of GFC in the case 
of Albania banking system. This is different to the findings of Dushku (2016), thus 
confirming that the GFC has changed the competition – stability nexus to a linear 
interaction. Therefore, we suggest that perfect competition is the desirable market 
structure in order to promote great stability in the banking sector in the case of Albania. 
In addition, as for other control variables, our results confirm that supervisors and 
policy-makers should carefully monitor macroeconomic risks since lower economic 
growth and higher sovereignty risks are associated with greater bank instability. Our 
25 
 
results further indicate a negative linkage between operational efficiency and bank 
stability implying that lower efficiency banks are more destine to bank instability. 
Finally, our results show that supervisors should be also aware of capital structure of 
banks as higher capital ratio significantly boosts the state of bank stability conditions.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Graph 1. Bank competition and bank stability, 2008 -2015. 
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Source: Bank of Albania, Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
Table 1. Indicators used to estimate Bank Stability Index. 
Category Indicator Notation 
Sub-
Index 
Capital Capital Adequacy Ratio C1 
ZC 
Core Capital/Total Asset  C2 
Equity/Total Asset C3 
Asset growth  C4 
Equity Growth  C5 
Fixed Asset/Regulatory Capital  C6 
ROE C7 
Non-Performing Loan (net)/Regulatory Capital C*8 
Asset 
Quality 
Non-Performing Loan (net)/Total Loan (net) A
*
1 
ZA 
Total Loan (net)/Total Asset A2 
Growth of Loan Portfolio  A3 
Credit Loss (Gross)/Total Loan (Gross) A
*
4 
Large Risks (the number of beneficiaries over rate) A*5 
Provisions for Loan Loss Coverage/Non-Performing Loan (gross)  A
*
6 
Earnings ROA E1 
ZE 
The growth of revenue from interest E2 
Interest revenue/Total Revenue E3 
Net Interest Margin E4 
Efficiency Ratio E5 
Interest Revenue (Net)/Operating Revenues (Gross) E6 
Dividend/Income (Net) E7 
The growth of net interest revenue E8 
Liquidity Net Loan/Average Deposits L1 
ZL 
Active Liquid/Total Asset L2 
Asset – Passive with a maturity of three months/Total Asset that 
provide profit 
L3 
Sensitivity 
to Market 
Risk 
Asset – Passive sensitive to interest rate with a maturity up to 3 
months/Total Asset that Provide Profit 
S*1 
ZS Asset – Passive sensitive to interest rate with a maturity up to 12 
months/Total Asset that Provide Profit 
S*2 
Net Open Position in foreign currency S*3 
* linked to reverse risk order 
Source: Author’s Calculations  
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Table 2. Data description and Source 
Indicator Description Source 
Expected 
Sign 
CAELS Logarithm of the bank stability index as explained in 
Section 3.1. 
Author’s 
calculations 
 
GDP Logarithm of the real gross domestic production. INSTAT (+) 
PSRISK The spread between domestic 12 months T-Bills and 
the German 12 months T-Bills. 
Bank of Albania, 
Bloomberg 
(-) 
BOONE Logarithm of the estimated competition index 
variable as explained in Section 3.2. 
Author’s 
calculation 
(+) or (-) 
EFFICIENCY Logarithm of the gross expenditure to gross income 
ratio 
Bank of Albania 
(-) 
LEVERAGE Logarithm of the equity to asset ratio of individual 
banks. 
Bank of Albania 
(+) 
CRISIS Dummy variables that takes the value of 1 during the 
period 2008 Q3 to 2010 Q04, and 0 otherwise. 
Author’s 
calculations 
(-) 
TC Sum of personnel expenses, other administrative 
expenses and other operating expenses. 
Bank of Albania 
 
Q Total bank assets Bank of Albania  
P1 Personnel expenses over total assets Bank of Albania  
P2 Other administrative expenses plus other operating 
expenses over total fixed assets 
Bank of Albania 
 
P3 Interest expenses over total deposits Bank of Albania  
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Panel Unit Root Test. 
Variable 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square PP - Fisher Chi-square 
Intercept 
Intercept 
and Trend 
None Intercept 
Intercept 
and Trend 
None 
ΔCAELS [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0018] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
ΔGDP [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [1.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
ΔPSRISK [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [1.0000] [0.0000] 
ΔBOONE [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [1.0000] [0.0000] 
EFFICIENCY [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.9649] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.8965] 
LEVERAGE [0.0000[ [0.0007] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0006] [0.0010] 
Note: Δ is a first difference operator. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 4. Results of the estimated TCF model for the banking system in Albania. 
Dependent Variable: TC  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2006Q1 2015Q4 [Periods included: 37] 
Cross-sections included: 16 [Total panel (balanced) observations: 592] 
TC=C(1)+C(2)*Q+0.5*C(3)*Q^2+C(4)*P1*P2+C(5)*P1*P3+C(6)*P2*P3+C(7)*Q*P1+C(8)*Q*P
2+C(9)*Q*P3+C(10)*CRISIS+C(11)*TREND+0.5*C(12)*TREND^2+C(13)*TREND*Q 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) -1.841582 0.070474 -26.13149 0.0000 
C(2) 0.702095 0.013465 52.14134 0.0000 
C(3) 0.012003 0.001404 8.548697 0.0000 
C(4) 0.125376 0.005900 21.24969 0.0000 
C(5) -0.005697 0.001702 -3.346970 0.0009 
C(6) 0.008747 0.000853 10.24833 0.0000 
C(7) -0.016883 0.001523 -11.08201 0.0000 
C(8) 0.086373 0.000322 267.8648 0.0000 
C(9) -0.002241 0.000210 -10.66969 0.0000 
C(10) 0.007338 0.003034 2.418254 0.0159 
C(11) 0.003709 0.001219 3.043121 0.0024 
C(12) 7.74E-06 2.57E-05 0.301182 0.7634 
C(13) -0.000390 8.56E-05 -4.549645 0.0000 
R-squared 0.999681     Mean dependent var 8.141240 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999674     S.D. dependent var 1.512308 
S.E. of regression 0.027303     AIC -4.341939 
SSR 0.431612     SIC -4.245680 
Log likelihood 1298.214     HQ -4.304445 
F-statistic 151054.4     DW statistic 0.508758 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 
Table 5. Results of the estimated Boone indicator, for loan market in Albania. 
Dependent Variable: MS 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2004Q1 2015Q4 [Periods included: 48] 
Cross-sections included: 16 [Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 759] 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.529876 0.177257 8.630823 0.0000 
MC -0.224535 0.076630 -2.930128 0.0035 
CRISIS 0.017707 0.142024 0.124679 0.9008 
R-squared 0.011254     Mean dependent var 1.049670 
Adjusted R-squared 0.008635     S.D. dependent var 1.602471 
S.E. of regression 1.595538     AIC 3.776248 
SSR 1922.034     SIC 3.794576 
Log likelihood -1428.198     HQ 3.783307 
F-statistic 4.296927     DW statistic 0.021330 
36 
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.013945  
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Table 6. Empirical Results based on GMM approach. 
Model Estimation 
Banking System 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
ΔGDP 0.7827* 0.9494** 0.8169* 0.5475* 0.7000* 0.7092* 0.9319* 
ΔPSRISK -0.053* -0.0549** -0.0534* -0.0301* -0.0312* -0.0543* -0.0279* 
ΔBOONE 0.171* 0.1996      
ΔBOONE^2  -0.0313      
ΔBOONE*   0.0581*     
LERNER    -0.2042**    
LERNER*     -0.0312***   
PROFITELASTICITY      0.0304  
HHI       -0.9244* 
EFFICIENCY -0.304* -0.4118*** -0.2962*** -0.1351 -0.3839* -0.2946** -0.2252*** 
LEVERAGE 0.328** 0.5674** 0.3114*** 0.2042*** 0.4864* 0.0522 0.4215* 
Cross-sections 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Instrument rank 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
No. of observations:  448 448 448 493 434 480 480 
J-statistic 11.9 8.6 17.6 18.4 15.8 12.0 18.5 
Probability of J-statistic 0.37 0.57 0.28 0.19 0.33 0.29 0.19 
AR(1) 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 
AR(2) 0.26 0.49 0.45 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.53 
Table shows bank-level GMM regressions statistics on the empirical results of the estimations. Haussmann tests (J-Statistics and 
the Probability of J-Statistics) investigates the validity of the instruments used, and rejection of the null-hypothesis implies that 
instruments are valid as they are not correlated with the error term. The Arellano and Bond test results also require significant 
AR(1) serial correlation and lack of AR(2) serial correlation (See also Kasman and Kasman, 2015). The Probability appears in 
parentheses [ ] below estimated coefficients. 
  Source: Author’s Calculations 
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APPENDIX B 
 
As a robustness test, we estimate an alternative measure of the marginal cost in the 
Boone indictor formula
22
 following Leon (2014) and re-specify Equation (3) to include 
also additional control variable, namely bank capital. The specified model is expressed 
as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
+  
(B.1) 
 
Where,  is total equity of bank i at time t. This model is estimated based on the OLS 
approach. Then, assuming that inputs’ prices are still homogeneous, Equation (6) is re-
expressed as follows:  
 
 
(B.2) 
 
Following Clerides, et al., (2015) and Kasman and Kasman (2015) we estimated the 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner index at the bank level, as follows:  
 
 
(B.3) 
 
Where,  is the profit of bank i at time t, and other are as previously defined. Similar 
to the conventional Lerner index, the Adjusted Lerner index also ranges from 0 to 1, 
with larger values implying greater market power. Then, Clerides, et al., (2015) 
measure the profit elasticity by deriving from the efficiency adjusted Lerner index by 
solving for  in equation (B.3) and differentiating with respect to , as follows: 
 
 
(B.4) 
 
Hence, the efficiency adjusted Lerner index and the profit elasticity are two closely 
related concepts. 
                                                          
22 The results are provided upon request. 
